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... a similar list of Chinese priorities in "How China Sees America," pp. For more on this highly contested episode, see "Memo Offered to Revamp Pakistan's Security Policy," Dawn, November 18, 2011, 19. memo-offered-to-revamp-pakistan-security-policy; Mansoor Ijaz, "An Insider Analysis of Pakistan's 'Memogate' (The Daily Beast, December 10, 2011); "Analysis of the 2011-2012 U.S. Policy on Pakistan," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 2011, 10-11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 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dealings is now public, thanks to court proceedings starting in the late 1990s that investigated whether the ISI favored political candidates. See Dennis Kux, *Disenchanting Allies: The United States and Pakistan 1947–2000* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), for a look into the efforts by the Eisenhower (pp. First, Pakistani officers have clearly been schooled in Otto von Bismarck's theories of Realpolitik, for they never tire of explaining that a state must guard against its adversary's capabilities, not its intentions. Looking ahead to the future – a difficult and speculative business to be sure – Pakistan's most important role is likely to be the one it plays in the geopolitics of Asia, spanning from the energy-rich Persian Gulf and Central Asian states to the thriving economies of the Far East, especially that of China. USAID disbursed only \$179.5 million out of the first \$1.5 billion authorized by the KLB legislation. Beijing fears that Pakistan's internal problems could threaten China. Pakistan's refusal to cut ties with the Taliban, indeed its entire policy of supporting militant and extremist organizations, was morally reprehensible. Indeed, central to the history of the drone campaign inside Pakistan was its evolution over time. Author interview, Lahore, May 2012. Great Expectations to Greater Frustrations 167 It is at least conceivable that Islamabad might have stepped up to the plate in the way Clinton asked. Nuclear differences sparked a short-lived rupture in the relationship; Washington suspended civilian aid to Pakistan. A series of crises over the course of 2011 sent the relationship crashing to its lowest point since 9/11. 162-3. American frustration and anger over Pakistan's inaction against Afghan Taliban and terrorists in North Waziristan – along with suspicions about how bin Laden could have escaped Pakistan's attention in Abbottabad for so long – had by that point led a number of American policy analysts and politicians to argue for a purely coercive or “containment” strategy in Pakistan.116 In different ways, the KLB debacle, Washington's expanded counterterrorism operations on Pakistani soil, and mixed U.S. signals regarding the war in Afghanistan all set the stage for the calamitous deterioration in relations between Washington and Islamabad from 2010 to 2012. Quote is taken from Nicholas Schmidle, “Shireen Mazari: The Ann Coulter of Pakistan,” *The New Republic*, January 8, 2010. . In 1999, Musharraf had grabbed power by toppling the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif. Given these immediate, vital, and emergent U.S. interests in Pakistan, the next question is what Washington might realistically expect to achieve in its relationship with Islamabad. Indeed, the rising tide of Asian wealth may be the only external force powerful enough to lift even Pakistan's leaky boat. 102 On General Kayani's doubts, specifically about U.S. long-term investment in the Afghan security forces, see Jane Perlez, “The Fight over How to End a War,” *New York Times*, October 19, 2011. And because Kashmir's sky-touching ranges stand at the intersection of India, Pakistan, and China, many unfortunate souls have been lost to the elements in vain attempts to secure the commanding heights, even though they offer little discernible military utility. For a comprehensive study of Afghanistan's regional context, see Ashley J. Yet the Bush team appreciated that the end of the Cold War and the rise of China represented fundamental shifts in the global balance of power. Pakistan would have to be ready for whatever followed. 78. In January 2010, the highway was submerged by a lake created when a landslide blocked the nearby Hunza River. In 2011, a free-spirited Pakistani pop band satirically named itself the Beygairat Brigade (a brigade without honor) and released a single “Aalu Anday” (“Potatoes and Eggs”). Drones, CIA contractors, and the bin Laden raid – far more than KLB aid dollars, diplomatic dialogues, or American businessmen – defined the U.S. presence in Pakistan. U.S. embassy Islamabad, in particular, has welcomed and assisted me during various research trips. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Pentagon Worries Led to Command Change,” *Washington Post*, August 17, 2009, 9081602304\_pf.html. Like al-Qaeda and other radical Islamists, HuT's goal is to create a new “Khalifah state to be an 98 99 Nahal Toosi, “In Pakistan, Islamic Schools for Women Thrive,” *MSNBC*, June 27, 2010. . 106 No Exit from Pakistan greater political weight in Washington and Islamabad.4 In both instances, his damning conclusion came as a shock to many Pakistanis who had considered Mullen a “pro-Pakistani” voice among Obama's top officials. KLB became a tragic symbol of American diplomatic missteps in Pakistan and the yawning gap between Washington's rhetoric and its capacity for follow-through. 139; Fair, *The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan*, pp. Over the same period, relations between Washington and Islamabad have run from frustrating to infuriating. In 1976, before the Dutch could arrest him, Khan fled to Pakistan with his family. Members of the team are experts at handling nuclear devices and rendering them safe. The muck seeps into every debate over how best to manage relations with the United States, but it does not stop there. Their inability to steer the president away from the Iraq war is the most widely cited example of that fact, but it was hardly the only one. For more on HuT, see Michael Kugelman, “Another Threat in Pakistan, in Sheep's Clothing,” *New York Times*, August 3, 2012. . As Chief Operating Officer Kamran Azim explained in 2012, newly elected civilian politicians opportunistically colluded with borrowers, telling them that they did not need to repay Kashf if they would pay a fraction of what they owed to the politicians instead.50 Others suggest that Kashf managed the crisis poorly, and that inadequate oversight made the organization susceptible to this crisis in the first place.51 Either way, rather than giving up, the leaders of Kashf decided to try out a new lending process. That, in turn, discourages the sorts of investments and entrepreneurial activity that could jumpstart the underperforming economy. From the Outside-In 181 assembly of Indian business executives that “President Bush has a big idea about India-U.S. relations. For years to come, these political realities are likely to frame the way Washington deals with Islamabad. In her Asia Society speech, she noted that “Pakistan also has responsibilities of its own, including taking decisive steps to ensure that the Afghan Taliban cannot continue to conduct the insurgency from Pakistani territory. 145–150. 230. A military-first approach to Pakistan would also do more harm than good. 19. TheConundrumofMicrofinanceGrowthinPakistan-RoshanehZafar.pdf. The United Kingdom also played an extensive role in these conversations.75 In the early lead-up to elections in 2007, the deal held particular appeal in Washington since the most realistic alternative – at least until the dual crises of the Supreme Court and the Red Mosque shook Musharraf's hold on power – looked like a repetition of 2002, when Musharraf had blatantly manipulated elections and reasserted his dictatorial authority. [Excised], ◆sarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB358a/doc26.pdf. The incident was ultimately defused diplomatically, although Beijing did not return the U.S. EP-3 for three months. Some, like al-Qaeda's 2009 Christmas Day scheme to bring down a Northwest Airlines flight bound for Detroit, have nearly succeeded. 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Tellis identifies the various dangers posed by “subconventional violence” between India and Pakistan in Stability in South Asia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997), briefings/DB185. “Never before so few have plundered so many,” he said at his first news conference. 4 U-Turn to Drift U.S.-Pakistan Relations during the Musharraf Era Almost exactly ten years after the 9/11 attacks, Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the U.S. Congress that the Haqqani network – a branch of the Afghan Taliban based in Pakistan's tribal areas – operated as a “veritable arm” of the Pakistani state.1 The chairman's claim came in the aftermath of several high-profile Haqqani-orchestrated attacks inside Afghanistan, including one in which armed gunmen briefly managed to fire into the U.S. Embassy grounds from a nearby Kabul construction site.2 None of these attacks threatened to dislodge NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan in a military sense. Worse, as Chapter 3 shows, the experience of U.S.-Pakistan interaction over decades has contributed to three strands of anti-Americanism, each of which throws up new barriers to cooperation of the sort that might once have been possible. Great Expectations to Greater Frustrations 141 one of its early sponsors, Senator Joe Biden, became vice president, the idea was nearly ready for prime time. They suggested deep internal doubts about the new escalation.104 Those doubts were also reflected in U.S. policy when the president combined his surge with a public pledge that it would only be temporary. By silencing Khan and shutting down his activities, Musharraf managed to deflect American pressure for a more comprehensive investigation or nuclear devices and rendering them safe. The muck seeps into every debate over how best to manage relations with the United States, but it does not stop there. 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